Abstract: A vulnerability analysis of possible use in security studies is presented. The analysis of the London underground network suggests that the stations bombed on 7 July, 2005 may not have been chosen randomly. From the viewpoint of effectively disturbing the transport system, nearly the best choice was made out of roughly 3 million possible combinations for attacking three stations. By comparing the underground networks of London, Tokyo and Budapest, we discuss the vulnerability of their underground networks. It seems to be plausible that such calculations can be made by softwares used widely in social network analysis. The predictive power of network analysis can be helpful in setting priorities in defence.
Introduction
Understanding and predicting the future activity of terrorist organisations is a major challenge, but a challenge that we must address given today's global security environment. Unpredictability is a key characteristic of terrorist activities, for two main reasons:
• terrorists have many more categories of legitimate targets, as well as a worldwide scope, compared to traditional security concerns (which used to have the comparable luxury of protecting obvious military assets, or home territory) • terrorist attacks can have different objectives: to harm people; to damage infrastructure; to cause panic; to destroy objects of symbolic value, or any combination of these or a number of other possible means to terrorists' differing ends.
Although such objectives may often overlap, these varying objectives lead to varying types or locations of targets. However, despite the seemingly endless list of potential targets, and the various types of objective, some targets still stand out as more obvious than others. A crucial goal of counterterrorism is to prioritise high-risk assets and distribute finite security resources accordingly. Predictions do not come easily, but what is even more difficult is to test such predictions. In order to do so, one would need robust hypotheses and quantitative arguments for how terrorists prepared an attack and then data to determine whether these hypotheses are borne out.
In this paper, we present an examination of the London underground system using 'network analysis' and from this analysis, derive hypotheses about the possible basis of target selection for the 7 July, 2005 attack. We represent the underground system by a network containing nodes (the underground stations) and links (line segments between neighbouring stations). The question of interest is which stations would have to be attacked to maximally disrupt the underground transport system, a question to which network analysis lends novel insights. We analyse whether the stations actually attacked represent a wise target list if the purpose of the attacks was to maximally damage the underground network.
This problem belongs to a wide family of questions appearing in many fields of science (see, for example, Jordán et al., 2006) . Most natural and technological (man-made) systems can be represented by networks, and recently there is a special interest in how these systems respond to the loss of parts (groups of nodes and links, cf. Borgatti, 2006) , and in particular, how networks react to loosing their nodes (and/or links, see Krebs, 2000) .
Data and methods
On the morning of 7 July, 2005 suicide bombers detonated explosives at three localities on the London underground system and a fourth bomb exploded on a bus. To pinpoint the explosions within the context of a simplified underground network is not straightforward, since their exact positions did not perfectly occur at particular stations or line segments. Based on subsequent press reports (Anonymous, 2005), we do know that the three explosions basically occurred at or near the stations of Edgware Road, Liverpool Street and King's Cross. For simplicity, we neglect the bus attack (at Tavistock Square) for the purposes of this study since it falls outside the framework of (or how to damage) the underground network. The network position of the attacked stations is the key interest of the present analysis and we studied different underground networks for the sake of comparison. These include a time series of the London underground maps, ranging from 1908 to 2016 and the 2005 maps of Tokyo and Budapest. Based on underground maps available online, we constructed networks showing the structure of the studied maps.
F. Jordán
The London underground network used in the analysis contains all 12 lines including the Docklands light railway but excluding the local overground railway system, since considering the latter would make very difficult defining the network of interest. The ends of some lines on the published maps were not shown but • this did not influence the results, or if it did, only to a minimal extent without affecting the conclusions • terrorists may have used exactly the same maps, if they performed similar calculations.
I treated underground networks as graphs where nodes represent stations and undirected and unweighted links represent line segments. The lack of direction is self-evident -there are no one-way parts of the system. However, the possibility of weighting the links remains of potential interest, since the quality of links could represent the amount of passengers flowing through that part of the system, or the frequency of trains (these could address some alternative objectives as mentioned at the beginning of the paper).
There is a number of techniques for characterising the effects of the loss (or destruction) of a node. The relevant measure depends on the problem. Passengers in the underground network typically want to travel from station j to station k as quickly as possible (i.e., through shortest paths). If the typical passenger attitude is to look for the shortest path, the ideal method of maximally disrupting infrastructure supporting traffic is to block as many shortest pathways as possible across the network. A simpler solution is to destroy a number of stations, but if sources are limited, some form of 'optimisation' is needed. Thus, we used Betweenness Centrality (BC) (Wassermann and Faust, 1994) to characterise the positional importance of stations (one by one in the intact network). Other centrality measures have also been checked (also the centrality of sets of nodes, Borgatti, 2006) but results are most interesting here. The efficiency of deleting certain nodes depends on the global topology of the network, quantified here by the Network Centrality Index (NCI) (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Borgatti et al., 2002) . A high NCI value indicates a network where deleting the most important nodes will very effectively damage the whole system. We analysed underground networks of different cities (London, Tokyo, Budapest) and also compared different developmental stages of the London underground in order to better understand the comparative vulnerability of these systems. Table 1 shows which London underground stations are highest ranked according to positional importance in the network, for several stages of its development during the 20th century. Table 1 also shows the overall NCI indices of each of these networks and, for comparison, two other underground rail networks: Tokyo and Budapest. Although the three London stations attacked on 7 July, 2005 are never all represented at any one time among the six highest ranks, one or two of them were always in the top ranks. In the present network of 2005, the ranks of positional importance are: 6 (King's Cross), 8 (Liverpool Street) and 23 (Edgware Road). However, network analysis raises the possibility that Edgware Road, a station of relatively minor importance in the network, might have been attacked by mistake or error instead of real intended target of Baker Street (ranked number 1), which is the immediately preceding station from the direction of King's Cross, from where the terrorists were spread out that morning. If we consider King's Cross, Liverpool Street and Baker Street, as the three hypothetically original targets, we would find a perfect fit to the top-three ranking stations in both the 1958 and the 1987 topologies (out of a total of 270 stations, see Figure 1 for the map from 1987) and a second best fit to the 1993 topology (there are more than 3.2 million possible combinations of choosing three targets in both cases). This suggests that the choice of stations was not random and might well have been made along the lines of network destruction. Even if the 2005 terrorist attacks were not in fact targeting these stations, it remains of considerable importance to determine the dynamics of key stations anyway, for prioritising and designing protection regimes. Furthermore, future developments to the underground network should consider how they may -inadvertently but significantly -alter the evenness of vulnerability of different stations as well as the identity of key stations. Table 1 demonstrates that the fate of the six positionally most important stations varies considerably over time as the network is developed and expanded. Developments already planned in near future for the London underground will radically change the positional importance ranks of stations by 2016 (see Table 1 ).
Results

Figure 1
The topology of the London underground network in 1987. Nodes and links represent stations and tunnel segments between them, respectively. Note that, in contrast to tourist maps, this graph reflects only the neighbourhood of stations (the 'topology') and is not realised in space, i.e., not a topographical map. The first three stations of the positional importance rank are marked by larger circles: the largest is Liverpool Street (#1), the second is Baker Street (#2) and the third one being just larger than the others is King's Cross (#3). Edgware Road is marked by a square: this station was bombed but probably instead of Baker Street, its neighbour How has network vulnerability as a whole changed over time? Comparing the different developmental stages of the London underground network from 1908 to 2016 (maps are available at http://www.clarksbury.com/cdl/maps.html), the NCI index has recently been decreasing, which makes target selection harder, but will be increased again by 2016 -that is, more vulnerable (Figure 4 ). London's NCI index has always been higher than Tokyo's in 2005 (map is available at http://www.tokyometro.jp/ network), where the more evenly interconnected network would provide weaker solutions for finding the key stations (Figures 2 and 4 , Table 1 ). On the contrary, for example, the very simple Budapest network, which fans out from a single central location, gives an example of a very high NCI value, where the positional importance rank provides a highly effective solution for damaging network architecture ( Figures 3 and 4 , Table 1 ).
Figure 2
The topology of the Tokyo underground network in 2005. The first three stations of the positional importance rank are marked by circles larger than others, according to their importance rank (the largest is the most important one, see also Table 1 ) Figure 3 The topology of the Budapest underground network in 2005. The first three stations of the positional importance rank are marked by circles larger than others, according to their importance rank (the largest is the most important one, see also Table 1 ). This figure illustrates a highly centralised network (see NCI values in Figure 4 ) Figure 4 The 'Network Centrality Index' (NCI) values (based on betweenness centrality (BC), of all nodes in the system) as they change over time in the developing London underground network (circles). The NCI values for the Tokyo underground (square) and the Budapest underground (triangle) are also shown for comparison. The high NCI value of Budapest suggests that the rank is more important, e.g., bombing 'Deák tér' (rank #1) in Budapest is very effective (cf. Figure 3 , see Table 1 )
Discussion and outlook
A network analysis reveals that, if the aim of the 7 July, 2005 London terrorist attack was to disrupt the underground infrastructure, then optimal or nearly optimal solutions were chosen for maximally destroying the underground network architecture. Much more sinister than this observation, however, is the distinct possibility that the terrorist attack was actually prepared using the methods and techniques of network analysis (perhaps, curiously, using relatively old underground maps). It is highly improbable that near-optimal stations were targeted by chance. As noted above, choosing three stations out of 270 leads to over 3 million solutions, and even narrowing this down to a subset of candidate busy and multiline stations leaves many hundreds of possible combinations. The network analysis presented above is very simple and can be performed by any reasonably quantitative person using widely known and available freeware. We hypothetise, based on the results presented here, that Edgware Road might have emerged as an apparent target only because the intended detonation at Baker Street failed. Finally, the network analysis also suggests that the primary task was to damage the infrastructure and not to kill as many people as possible (which would have been better achieved with different targets). If terrorist use network analyses or similar methods, it may be possible to predict future hot spots and comparative analyses may be of high relevance. Whether they use them or not, however, network analyses nevertheless lend crucial insights to how we should prioritise and distribute our limited counter terrorism resources among and within key networks (which are represented by numerous systems: airports; rail networks; waterworks; power grids; communication links and so on). Given the enormous costs that are incurred by infrastructure disruption in the wake of terrorist attacks, we should be concerned with identifying and protecting their (often hidden) vulnerabilities even if the infrastructure itself is not the terrorists' primary target (like probably in case of the second London attack on 21 July, 2005 and the 20 March, 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo underground system, where the target was clearly more people than infrastructure, given that it used poisonous gas rather than explosives -a gas attack is supposed to target crowded, not structurally more important places). More recent events widely reported in the news in October 2005 highlight the importance of an analysis of the New York City underground system. The New York City network is, however, very hard to define, since it is highly interconnected to the railway system. This reveals a limit on the topological analysis of different systems. A similar constraint raises problems for even fairly well-defined systems like the London underground: if the underground system is not analysed as a whole in isolation, results may well be different. For example, Heathrow station, a gateway between the global air transport system and the local transport network, is an evidently important target station but its BC-value equals zero from the underground network perspective (it does not fall between any other two stations). Three possibilities for further research are: • to analyse the 'essential' part of underground networks only, i.e., to truncate them and discard the suburban regions (although preliminary studies of this kind revealed very similar results)
• to consider passenger flux data and analyse weighted networks (for example, Shinjuku is probably the most crowded station in Tokyo but its topological importance is only ranked 8)
• to improve optimisation and provide better results by approaches characterising the centrality of sets of nodes (Borgatti, 2006) . This study is of partly hypothetical nature. However, it presents a novel way to a serious and difficult challenge posed by the threat of global terrorism, namely understanding and reacting to terrorist target selection, and it is unusual in using and producing quantitative data that lead to specific objective predictions. These are, of course, the 'weak side' of counterterrorist activity, in that they represent passive responses to attack rather than active prevention of the cause. Our analysis is only one aspect of network-related security issues (see e.g., Krebs, 2001) . A general question remaining open is whether the defensive or the offensive side follows the other's strategy: in other words, are the networks engineered and/or analysed by one or both sides, how, and by whom? We still hold the view that the best solution for escaping terrorist attacks is prevention, but network analyses may nevertheless help to bolster our defences given that terrorism remains a significant threat.
Many other approaches could be used to reduce vulnerability, but the key aim of this work is not to find the best solution -but to find the terrorists solution. The reason is that we do not plan to destroy but to predict destruction.
